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Erich Fromm is rarely perceived as a political writer, despite his consistent commitment 
to socialist humanism and a long record of support for radical causes. The attraction of 
best-sellers like The Art of Loving and To Have or To Be? has been based largely on the 
promise of the spiritual guidance which might help the individual reader negotiate an 
unfeeling age.1 Aware of the danger that his work might be used for emotional 
escapism, he deliberately left material out of his final work, To Have or to Be?, in order 
to dispel the idea that the problems of living in late capitalist society could be resolved 
by spiritual regeneration on the part of enlightened individuals without fundamental 
political and economic change.2 Such change, according to Fromm, could come about 
only with a simultaneous revolution in values, and he advocated a democratic socialism 
which expressed `the establishment of new moral values' and `the realisation of 
human solidarity'.3 To this end he developed a social psychology and humanistic ethics 
which owed much to the work of the early Marx on human essence and its alienation, 
and then lent support to a range of socio-political initiatives which he considered might 
move us closer to the goal of a non-alienated society. His work, taken as a whole, 
provides a shining example of the value of interdisciplinary socio-political theory and 
offers a strong ethical support for radical politics of both `old' and `new' social 
movements. 
  Fromm's upbringing and education in Frankfurt was steeped in orthodox 
Judaism and its rabbinical scholarship, from which he retained a penchant for prophetic 
messianism.4 He shared its vision of `universal peace and harmony between all 
nations' and, searching for ways to understand and overcome the obstacles to its 
achievement, enthusiastically embraced the work of Marx and Freud in the 1920s.5 In 
1929 he outlined an ambitious long-term research programme, arguing for the need to 
investigate `what connections there are between the social development of humanity, 
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particularly its economic and technical development, and its mental faculty, particularly 
the ego-organisation of the human being.' He proposed to do this through a historical 
anthropology which would give psychological categories a historical materialist form.6 
He brought this perspective to the Frankfurt School (the Institute of Social Research) in 
1930, originally working on a major empirical survey of working class character-types.7 
After fleeing Nazi Germany for the United States in 1934 with other members of the 
School he effected a decisive break with Freud's biological theory of instincts, instead 
developing a `culturalist' approach more compatible with Marxism's emphasis on social 
conditioning. Nevertheless, it offended senior colleagues such as Adorno, Horkheimer 
and Marcuse, and he left the School in 1939.8 Shortly afterwards he produced a 
psychological overview of the development of social consciousness from the 
Reformation to the mid-twentieth century, The Fear of Freedom, which provides the 
analytical framework for much of his subsequent work.9  
 The key conceptual innovation in The Fear of Freedom, the idea of `social 
character', will be outlined in the next section, followed by a critical discussion of his 
provocative attempt to formulate a humanistic ethics grounded in a theory of human 
essence in Man for Himself (1947). This text remains relatively neglected, despite the 
recent revival of interest in `character' or `virtue' ethics, but I will argue that it can 
provide a powerful theoretical foundation for emancipatory politics. I will then introduce 
Fromm's attempts to develop an ethical socialist politics in various interventions at 
three levels - everyday life, democratic institutions, and the emerging `One World'. 
Finally I will press the claim that Fromm's social thought offers an important ethical 
dimension which ought to be an essential component of an effective emancipatory 
social theory. 
 
 
Social Psychology 
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In The Fear of Freedom Fromm situates the role of social psychology as attempting to 
resolve the Marxian dialectical contradiction that history makes `man' while at the 
same time `man' makes history.10 As well as understanding how passions and anxieties 
are moulded by the social process, social psychology attempts to show how those 
energies in turn become productive forces capable of moulding that social process.11 
Social character refers to that part of the character structure of individuals which is 
common to most members of a particular social group, developed in response to their 
conditions of life: 
  The social character comprises only a selection of traits, the essential 
nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group which has 
developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life 
common to that group.12 
Character is shaped by the dynamic adaptation of needs to social reality, and, in its 
turn, character conditions the thinking, feeling, and acting of individuals. Despite his 
use of the word `determines', Fromm consistently stresses the dynamism of human 
nature whereby individuals and groups are able to resist the seduction of certain 
enslaving adaptations and open up the possibility of positive freedom through self-
realisation.13 The concept of social character helps to explain the link between the 
material basis of society and the ideological superstructure. It is the `intermediary' 
between the socioeconomic structure and the ideas and ideals prevalent in society. The 
economic basis conditions social character, which in turn conditions the ideas and ideals 
of a class or group, and which in turn helps to mould the social character and, 
reciprocally, creates the ideological preconditions which support the economic 
structure.14 
 Released from the pessimism inherent in Freud's death instinct, Fromm was able 
to keep open the possibility that, on the basis of what we all share as human beings, 
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we are capable of creating a society in which the prevalent relationship of domination 
and submission is rejected in favour of a relationship of solidarity.15 However, the bulk 
of The Fear of Freedom and much of his other work analyses the negative part of the 
dialectic of the `progress' of modernity. The analysis of the psychology of socio-
economic change in various social classes from the time of the Reformation through to 
the twentieth century reveals a variety of ways of suppressing the freedom which was 
on offer as a result of the break from the political, economic and spiritual shackles that 
bound people in pre-modern times. According to Fromm, modernity involves a 
breakdown of old securities which is so frightening that different social groups resort to 
belief systems and movements which bind them to new forms of domination and 
submission. With the Reformation, the authority of the Church is replaced by the 
authority of the State, which is in turn replaced by the authority of conscience. In the 
twentieth century, western industrial society in its monopolistic phase makes for the 
development of a personality which feels powerless, lonely, and insecure and whose 
loss of identity alone makes it even more imperative to conform to the expectations of 
others.16 One political response lies in surrendering freedom to a new authoritarianism, 
or, where liberal democracy prevails, to the `anonymous authority of common sense 
and public opinion.'17  
 The Fear of Freedom is a sweeping psychological history of modernity. It 
historicises Marx's insights on alienation and commodity fetishism and offers compelling 
explanations of the socio-psychological processes through which the `freedom' which 
emerges with the development of capitalism leaves people isolated and dominated by 
forces beyond their control.18 However, an important shift may be discerned in the final 
chapter of the book, dealing with `Freedom and Democracy'. In dealing with the social 
character of those who embraced fascism, either as participants or as supporters, 
Fromm focuses on the lower middle classes, but when it comes to discussing social 
character in democratic societies he is not class specific, often implicitly classifying us all 
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as part of a mass, as when he suggests that `we have become automatons who live 
under the illusion of being self-willed individuals.'19 There are dire warnings on the 
tendency of modern democratic societies to extract conformity from their citizens 
through competitive pressures and media simplifications, discouraging spontaneity and 
critical thinking. The cultural and political crisis, argues Fromm, is not due to the fact 
that there is too much individualism, `but that what we believe to be individualism has 
become an empty shell.'20 Many years later Fromm summarised the social character of 
the late twentieth century as homo consumens, the person driven to consume more 
and more in compensation for `inner vacuity, passivity, loneliness, and anxiety.'21 Yet 
although this theme of the atrophied and atomised person is almost a leitmotif of 
Frankfurt School thinking, the warnings here are counterbalanced by a sense of hope: 
  If there is anything to be surprised at - and encouraged by - I believe it is 
the fact that the human race...has retained - and actually developed - 
such qualities of dignity, courage, decency and kindness as we find them 
throughout history and in countless individuals today.22 
The book concludes by pleading for the emergence of democratic socialism - although 
he adds that the name does not matter - in order that people can assert control over 
the processes which currently reduce the average individual to insignificance. The 
imperative is to replace manipulation by active and intelligent cooperation through the 
extension of the democratic principle into the economic sphere.23   
 
 
Humanistic Ethics 
 
Fromm's major ethical text, Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, 
was published in 1947. As a text in ethics it is unconventional, for it spurns the `rules 
and principles' approach which had dominated the philosophical treatment of ethics for 
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two centuries, opting instead for an approach which is sometimes termed `character 
ethics'.24 As Fromm says, `the virtuous or vicious character rather than single virtues or 
vices is the true subject matter of ethical inquiry.'25 Character ethics reach back to the 
philosophy of Ancient Greece, and Fromm's debt to Aristotle (in this one respect) is 
freely acknowledged. In recent years Alisdair MacIntyre has championed a return to 
ethical Aristotelianism, arguing that the Enlightenment attempt to justify morality was 
bound to fail because it had jettisoned the central element on which all moral thought 
up to that time had been based, namely, the idea of a human nature and a human 
telos.26  The abandonment of the idea of an essential human nature striving towards a 
telos leaves conventional moral philosophy the impossible task of deriving moral 
precepts from a view of `untutored' human nature.27 More often than not the moral 
precepts of Enlightenment philosophers are designed to combat the inclinations of that 
nature. In this view what is natural to humanity is often seen as `an enemy within', 
something to be suppressed if good is to be achieved. Fromm explicitly criticises this 
internalised authoritarianism, expressed not only in the theology of Luther and Calvin 
but also in the moral system of Kant, for whom the pursuit of one's own happiness has 
no positive ethical value, supreme happiness being found only in the fulfilment of 
duty.28 This idea that there is a natural propensity for evil and that the moral law is 
necessary to suppress it is anathema to Fromm, for whom loving one's self and loving 
one's neighbour is not a phenomenon transcending humanity but rather an inherent 
attribute of that humanity.29 It is the power by which we relate to and appropriate the 
world. We find fulfilment and happiness only in `relatedness and solidarity' with our 
fellows.30   
 What, then, is Fromm's conception of human nature? Like Aristotle, he poses 
the question of what it is that distinguishes the human being from other animals. For 
Fromm, `self-awareness, reason and imagination' disrupt the `harmony' which 
characterises animal nature. The human being is at once part of nature and yet 
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transcends the rest of nature; reason drives us to endless striving for new solutions to 
the problems which ever-developing needs confront. The human life is one of 
`unavoidable disequilibrium' in which there can be no return to a prehuman state of 
harmony with nature but only a development of reason towards mastery of nature, 
including human nature.31 Only by recognising that the only meaning to life is that 
which is given by humans through productive living can the possibility develop of 
achieving happiness through the full realisation of the faculties which are peculiarly 
human - reason, love, and productive work.32 In Man For Himself he cites Aristotle and 
Spinoza as the leading humanist philosophers, but also endorses Marx's comment in 
Capital that it is vital to distinguish between human nature in general and human 
nature as modified in each historical period.33 In later writings Fromm's debt to Marx's 
conception of human essence becomes clear. In The Revolution of Hope (1968) he 
comments that perhaps the most significant definition of the species characteristic of 
`man' had been given by Marx in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts when he 
summarised it as `free, conscious activity'.34 For Fromm, as for Marx, the fulfilment of 
our potential as creative human beings is imperative. Indeed Fromm makes explicit the 
essentialist ethical dimension of Marx's work, focusing on the struggle to overcome the 
alienation of the human essence in order to achieve a `realm of freedom' in which self-
realisation becomes possible for all human beings.35 
 For Fromm, humanistic ethics is based on the principle that `good' is what is 
good for us as human beings and `evil' is what is detrimental to us, and the sole 
criterion of ethical value is human welfare.36 `Good' is regarded as the affirmation of 
life through the unfolding of man's powers and `virtue' as responsibility to our own 
existence, whereas `evil' is the crippling of our power and vice is irresponsibility toward 
oneself.37  Drawing on Aristotle and Spinoza, Fromm commends `productiveness' and 
the `productive orientation', involving the full development of the human capacities for 
creativity, love, and reason. Failure to live in this way results in `dysfunction and 
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unhappiness' for the individual,38 and if this happens on a widespread scale the result 
is a `socially patterned defect.'39 The contrast between productive and non-productive 
orientations is therefore vital if Fromm's ethics is to be meaningful as a `practical' 
ethics. The non-productive orientations are presented as the receptive, exploitative, 
hoarding and marketing types, the latter being the most recent development whereby 
the character is dependent on the requirements of the market.40 It is important to note 
that as the concept of social character is a dynamic one these sub-orientations are not 
mutually exclusive, and nor are productive and non-productive orientations. Rather it is 
a question of which orientations predominate and why. In his account of the productive 
orientation he effectively maps out a modern equivalent of what the Ancient Greek 
philosophers referred to as the virtues.41 Productiveness involves the development of 
our human powers of rationality and love while avoiding exercising power as 
domination over others. Through productiveness we resolve the paradox of human 
existence by simultaneously expressing our oneness with others and our uniqueness.42  
 Fromm distinguishes between `universal' and `socially immanent' ethics, noting 
that universal principles such as `thou shalt not kill' or `love thy neighbour as thyself' 
have been amazingly similar in all cultures, but that there are also principles which are 
specific to particular cultures and even social classes within cultures whose virtues need 
to be adhered to if the social entity is to survive.43 Ultimately, there will remain a 
conflict between the two different types of ethics `as long as humanity has not 
succeeded in building a society in which the interest of "society" has become identical 
with that of its members.' The contradiction between absolute and immanent principles 
will tend to disappear only if society becomes progressively free and human.44  
Fromm's account of the major moral problem of the age - `man's indifference to 
himself' - is, in effect, an ethico-psychological account of what commodity fetishism 
does to human relations and mental health. He argues that the pursuit of money, 
prestige and power prevents us from recognising the interests of our real self, and he 
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bemoans the fact that we bow down to the `anonymous power of the market' and `of 
the machine whose servants we have become.'45 
 There are some obvious objections to Fromm's psychological ethics. First, it 
might be asked why his view of what constitutes the fully lived or truly human life 
should be regarded as more valid than any other. Fromm insists that his normative 
principles are `objectively valid', rejecting the view which has prevailed from the time 
of Kant that objectively valid statements can be made only about facts and not about 
values.46 He points to the arts and also to applied sciences such as medicine and 
engineering, where it is common to construct objectively valid norms by which to judge 
the success of a project, and where failure to comply with them is penalized by poor 
results. In his own sphere, he insists that living is an art and that humanistic ethics is 
`the applied science of the "art of living" based upon the theoretical "science of 
man".47 Fromm accepts that despite a wealth of data from anthropology and 
psychology we have only a very tentative picture of human nature,48 but he insists that 
`objectively valid' does not mean absolute, and that all scientific progress is based on 
provisional truths.49 Fromm repeatedly stresses the empirical and scientific nature of 
his psychology, based largely on his psychoanalytic practice. In the course of discussing 
the early development of his interest in social psychology Fromm claims `there is not a 
single theoretical conclusion about man's psyche...which is not based on a critical 
observation of human behaviour carried out in the course of this psychoanalytical 
work.'50 Fromm also pioneered survey work in order to clarify character types.51 This 
empirical work, combined with critical analysis of psychological categories developed by 
Freud and others, enables Fromm to speak with confidence about mental illness and 
mental health in the individual and in society.  
 A second potentially serious objection to his ethics centres on his faith in the 
capability of humanity realising its full potential through love, reason and human 
solidarity.52 Why, it may be asked, should we consider only this positive potential, 
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w
he social groups who live them.   
when humanity has all too often demonstrated its potential for wholesale 
destructiveness? Why conceive human nature as goodness struggling to be free, rather 
than as badness barely under control?53 Fromm was well aware of the danger to his 
humanistic thesis posed by views which emphasised destructiveness or aggression as 
ineluctable aspects of human nature. He rejected Freud's adoption of the death instinct, 
seeing it as a reflection of the collapse of liberal optimism in the horror of the First 
World War.54 For Fromm, destructiveness is essentially a `secondary potentiality', and 
although it possesses all the power and intensity of any passion, it is merely an 
alternative to creativeness, something that arises when the will to create cannot be 
satisfied.55 In this respect Fromm shares Marx's view of the historical progress of 
freedom while being under no illusion about the difficulty of advancing towards an 
emancipated society from a distinctly unpromising status quo.56 His most sustained 
ork, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, refutes the arguments of instinctivists 
and behaviourists who view aggression as inevitable, and also analyses `malignant 
aggression' as essentially a manifestation of the breakdown of creativeness.57 
Potentially serious destructive tendencies such as greed and envy are not strong 
because of their inherent intensity but because of `the difficulty of resisting the public 
pressure to be a wolf with the wolves.'58 I think Fromm's position on understanding 
destructiveness is correct, for whatever heinous crimes are perpetrated by humanity 
they should not be regarded as inevitable or natural, and indeed are not generally 
regarded as such. Society could not evolve were such behaviour endemic to humanity. 
Rather it is aberrational and subject to rational analysis of the interaction between 
antagonistic structures created by societies and t
 A third objection to Fromm's humanistic ethics concerns the difficulty of 
operationalising the ideal of the productive character. As we have seen, in Man For 
Himself it is contrasted with the non-productive orientations. Later, in The Anatomy of 
Human Destructiveness, he opposes biophilia (love of the living) to necrophilia (love of 
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the dead),59 and finally, in To Have or To Be?, he contrasts the being mode with the 
having mode. The being mode is a situation in which are activities are productive in the 
sense of being consciously directed at the enrichment of human existence, as opposed 
to the having mode in which activity is directed to acquiring wealth and power over 
others.60 Although he accepts that the having mode is socially dominant, he argues 
that only a small minority are governed entirely by it. There are still aspects of most 
people's lives in which they are genuinely touched by non-instrumental feelings for 
their fellow human beings.61 One of the problems in establishing pictures of the 
productive individual and the being mode is that psychoanalysis has traditionally 
focused on neuroses rather than well being. Fromm compares his ideal of 
productiveness with Freud's concept of the genital character, denoting a mature and 
happy personality, but notes that this concept has remained vague and abstract.62 The 
problem is made more complex by the theoretical move from the consideration of the 
mental health of the individual to that of society.63 Utopian thinking traditionally 
addresses the possibility of a happy society, but often this is seen merely as the 
removal of anxiety caused by material oppression or deprivation. These imaginary 
societies are often static, as with More's Utopia or Bellamy's Looking Backward, lacking 
the idea of transcendence which is central to Fromm's conception of human nature.  
 Despite these difficulties, a clear picture of the emancipated individual in the 
free society does emerge from Fromm's work, with the emphasis on a productive 
disposition and social relations infused with solidarity and love.64 Although he states 
that the real artist is the most convincing representative of productiveness, he argues 
that it is not necessary to have such creative gifts in order to live productively.65 
Productiveness is the realisation of human powers without imposing domination, as 
well as the development of loving relationships based on care, responsibility, respect, 
and knowledge.66 Perhaps his most succinct definition appears in To Have or To Be?: 
  The mode of being has as its prerequisites independence, freedom, and 
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the presence of critical reason. Its fundamental characteristic is that of 
being active, not in the sense of outward activity, of busyness, but of 
inner activity, the productive use of our human powers. To be active 
means to give expression to one's faculties, talents, to the wealth of 
human gifts with which - though in varying degrees - every human being 
is endowed. It means to renew oneself, to grow, to flow out, to love, to 
transcend the prison of one's isolated ego, to be interested, to `list' 
[listen], to give.67 
While it is possible for individuals to glimpse this condition through occasional 
experiences, it is clearly impossible to universalise such an ideal within the structures of 
capitalist society. In To Have or To Be? Fromm argues that the capitalist ideology of 
unlimited production, absolute freedom and unrestricted happiness amount to a new 
religion of Progress, `The Great Promise', based on the psychological premises that 
radical hedonism and egotism will lead to harmony and peace.68 The promise, of 
course, can never be met, for it is premised on not delivering general satisfaction but 
encouraging acquisitiveness, and the individual can never be satisfied because, as 
Fromm says, `there is no end to my wishes.'69 Indeed the logic of accumulation also 
encourages a constant fear of losing what we have gained.70   
 Is it possible to change the world for the better, to move it closer to a condition 
of human solidarity? Fromm realistically thinks it unlikely that this will be achieved, 
placing the odds against it at something like fifty to one, but he never lets go of the 
hope that there is a `real possibility', however small it may be.71 Perhaps more 
importantly, he identifies some grounds for hope within the developing social system 
even at a time when atomisation, conformism and fatalism appeared to be taking a 
firm grip. The next section will explore Fromm's identification of movements capable of 
promoting a humanistic ethic in challenging the values of a status quo which he 
regarded as mentally unhealthy and ultimately untenable. 
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Ethical Politics 
 
In 1968 Fromm lent his support to the candidature for the American Presidency of the 
radical Eugene McCarthy, and in one of the speeches he wrote for him he comments 
that it is not enough for people to become aware of the failings of the existing social 
and political processes, but that they must be able to constuct alternatives.72 Many of 
the campaigns which Fromm endorsed were responses to the immediate issues of the 
day, such as the Vietnam War and the nuclear super-power stand off. However, many 
of his other interventions retain a direct relevance to our present situation and promote 
an ethical approach which asks how people can promote processes and structures 
consonant with a more humane and productive life. As indicated earlier, they operate 
on three `levels': first, everyday life; second, political institutions within existing states; 
and third, the merging `One World'. 
 
Everyday Life   
A recurring theme in his contribution to a politics of everyday life is the experience of 
work. For Fromm, as for Marx, to produce was part of the human essence, although in 
modern society work was normally a stultifying experience. For the manual worker, de-
skilling has destroyed interest in the process of work, engendering a `socially patterned 
syndrome of pathology' manifested in apathy, boredom, lack of joy and a vague feeling 
that life is meaningless.73 The majority of workers suffer from the dictatorial authority 
structures of major corporations, in which managerial elites display virtually unlimited 
power. It is, according to Fromm, the very opposite of the democratic process, a 
situation of `power without control by those submitted to it.'74 But even when 
authoritarian managerial methods are not dominant, employees or the self-employed 
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are obliged to sell themselves, their personalities, in order to survive and progress. This 
concept of the `marketing orientation' is extremely useful in understanding the 
mediocrity of modern management in organisations which judge merit by arbitrarily 
imposed and unaccountable criteria. `Only in exceptional cases,' he writes, `is success 
predominantly the result of skill and of certain other human qualities like honesty, 
decency, and integrity.'75 In addition to direct managerial pressure, the insecurity of 
the labour market means that those in work live in fear of offending management or 
feel obliged to adjust their behaviour to conform to the organisational culture. Those 
who want to move into new occupations in mid-life have little opportunity to do so and 
become `trapped' for decades in work which holds no interest for them.  
 Fromm is quite clear that these problems will not be adequately resolved before 
the realisation of the final goal of socialism, democratic control of all economic 
activities, free cooperation of all citizens and the reduction of central state activity to a 
minimum.76 But he was acutely aware of the need to present `intermediate' socialist 
goals which could be pursued meaningfully by broad sections of working people. These 
intermediate goals include support for a Basic Income scheme, reduction in work-time, 
workers' participation in management, and stronger trade union activity on working 
conditions. The idea of a Guaranteed Income For All, currently enjoying renewed 
interest, was first supported by Fromm in The Sane Society (1956), where he argues 
that lifting the economic threat of starvation would make it very difficult to impose 
unacceptable working conditions.77  He sees it as a means to removing one of the 
greatest limitations on human freedom, `the threat of starvation against all who were 
unwilling to accept the conditions of work and social existence that were imposed upon 
them.'78 It is important to note that for Fromm the idea needed to be matched with 
greatly diminished working hours for all and measures to discourage socially damaging 
consumption. He talks of a move from `maximal' consumption to `optimal' 
consumption, without which those on the minimum basic income would feel frustrated 
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and worthless.79 Ideally, the Guaranteed Income would be a step towards liberating 
people from the domination of the world of work so that they would have the time to 
confront the critical questions about the direction in which society was travelling and 
the values it embodied.80  
 Another approach which Fromm considers significant is the work on human 
relations management pioneered by Elton Mayo in the late 1940s. In his study of the 
various experiments in management conducted at the Chicago Hawthorn Works of the 
Western Electric Company, Mayo demonstrates that the output of workers increased 
considerably not primarily because their conditions were improved 
but because they were involved in the decisions to set those conditions. Participation in 
decision-making not only improved their job satisfaction but also improved 
productivity.81 Although it is possible to dismiss human relations management as just 
another device to raise productivity, the demand for democracy in the workplace raises 
awareness of the authoritarian and largely unaccountable reality of most management 
systems. Evidence of the greater efficiency of participatory schemes also challenges the 
commonly held management assumption that workers will perform better only when 
working under the threat of performance measurement. In a socialist manifesto which 
he drafted for the American Socialist Party he demands workers' participation in the 
management of big corporations and a greater influence for trade unions, particularly 
on issues concerning working conditions.82 Writing in 1968, Fromm bemoaned the 
bureaucratisation of the unions and their over-concentration on wages, calling instead 
for a return to their original `broad social purpose'.83 His suggestion of face-to-face 
groups in the work-place to decide on conditions and working practices appears to 
have been inspired by the autogestion movement in France and the workers' self-
management system in Yugoslavia.84 Interestingly, despite the difficulties faced by 
workers' movements since Fromm made these appeals, trade unions have tended to 
broaden their endeavours to tackle sexism, racism, bullying, environmental damage 
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and health and safety issues. The weakening of collective bargaining which has 
accompanied post-fordism has nevertheless raised issues about the treatment of 
individuals and particular groups of workers which have provided unions with new 
opportunities to oppose the power of autocratic management. In the 1950s Fromm had 
anticipated the development of `super capitalism' with an extension of competition into 
the workplace itself through the widespread introduction of incentives such as 
performance-related pay and bonuses.85 But he continues to see the enduring 
significance of trade union activity in responding to the changing work environment 
and defending the dignity of labour. 
 A second issue of everyday life which interested Fromm was the social effect of 
the consumption process. In the world of advertising and marketing he saw the 
manipulation of needs and the imposition of conformity, but he also saw the possibility 
of contesting the power of the major corporations. With great prescience he supported 
the work of consumer movements as early as 1941: 
  The consumer movement has attempted to restore the customer's critical 
ability, dignity, and sense of significance, and thus operates in a direction 
similar to the trade union movement.86 
Although the development of capitalism brings with it an impulse to meet whatever 
desires are present in society, Fromm points out that there has always been regulation 
or prohibition of certain products, sometimes from concern with bodily harm but often 
on the basis of `vestigial remnants of the Puritan morality.'87 What Fromm would like 
to see is the advancement of `life-furthering' rather than `life-denying' consumption. 
His suggestion, made in 1968, that a group of experts (psychologists, sociologists, 
economists and consumers) could study consumption to establish which products were 
humane and which were not now appears somewhat naive,88 but the subsequent 
development of independent groups which promote such critical scrutiny is right in line 
with Fromm's attitude to making consumption a site of struggle. His championing of the 
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`revolution of the consumer'89 against the domination by industry anticipates some of 
the successful challenges to corporate capital that have since taken place. Ultimately, 
concludes Fromm, sane consumption only becomes possible when we curb the right of 
corporations to determine their production solely on the basis of profit and expansion.90 
Short of that, however, the struggle over consumption can reveal the irrationality of the 
global system of production and reflects a new desire to overcome passivity. So, the 
struggles against the tobacco corporations, the oil giants and the big banana producers 
help to question the logic of accumulation and promote awareness of the limitations of 
corporate power. Fromm calls for `consumer strikes' to unleash the potential of the 
humanist-minded consumers and to assert a genuine democratic impulse in an active 
and non-alienated fashion.91 
 A third aspect of everyday life which Fromm identifies as playing a key role in 
the struggle to transform values is feminism, or `women's liberation' as it was known 
to him. Deriding Freud's conception of women as little more than castrated men, 
Fromm, writing in 1969, categorises women as a class exploited by men in all 
patriarchal societies, requiring an ideology to explain their domination as `natural'.92 
His position was not merely a response to `second-wave' feminism, for as early as 
1934 he had written critically of the damaging aspects of `patricentric' psychic 
structures. Focusing on the nineteenth century work on matriarchy by J. J. Bachofen, 
Fromm relates patriarchy to the maintenance of class society and concludes that 
`matricentric' psychic structures are, implicitly, socialist.93 Bachofen viewed matriarchal 
society as democratic, sexually open, and without private property, in which maternal 
love and compassion were the dominant moral principles and injury to another was the 
gravest offence.94 According to Fromm, this chimed with the Marxist stress on the 
meeting of all material needs through democratic social control and the promise of a 
life of happiness residing in the harmonious unfolding of one's personality.95 Returning 
to the theme in 1969, Fromm relates the significance of the idea of the matriarchate to 
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the development of the `women's revolution' which was attempting to make a reality 
of the Enlightenment idea of the equality of all people.96 In To Have or To Be? he 
argues that the freedom of women from patriarchal domination is a `fundamental 
factor in the humanisation of society' and  concludes that if the women's movement 
can identify its role and function as an `anti-power' then women will have a `decisive 
influence' in the battle for a new society.97 Fromm perceives patriarchy as a distortion 
of human essence and feminism as a path to the achievement of true humanisation, an 
equality of recognition and respect. To be an `anti-power' is to acknowledge the 
sources and configurations of social power and for Fromm this is rooted in control of 
the means of production and administration. Postmodernist feminists like Iris Young 
reject this type of essentialism as inevitably denying the `ontological difference within 
and between subjects', but it not clear that the empowerment of a multitude of groups 
revelling in their differences can overcome the problem of `structural injustice' which 
she acknowledges and which imposes its own master narrative on our lives.98 
 
Democratic Institutions 
Moving on to the second level of social participation considered by Fromm, his work on 
renewing political democracy is more significant in principle than in the practical detail 
of his suggestions and interventions. However, it is important to note that he was 
prepared to engage in mainstream political activity even if it fell well short of his ideal 
of democratic socialism.  Here the contrast with Herbert Marcuse could not be clearer, 
for the latter disapproved of any involvement with established politics, prompting 
Fromm to accuse him of a lack of concern with politics.99 Fromm's ideas for renewing 
democratic politics first appear briefly in The Sane Society. He largely accepts the 
gloomy conclusions of Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that 
most citizens in modern western democracies were passive, apathetic and possessed 
little power over decision-making. To counter this Fromm suggests something like a 
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return to the old Town Meetings of the early United States, in face-to-face groups 
which are well informed and are capable of directly influencing the decisions made by 
the centrally elected parliamentary executive. Such groups might meet monthly and 
comprise of say, 500 citizens, based on areas or workplaces and hopefully composed of 
people from a variety of social backgrounds.100 These ideas are developed further and 
in greater detail in The Revolution of Hope, in which he suggests that the equivalent of 
the Town Meetings could become an official part of the decision-making process at 
state and federal level.101 He also suggests a National Council called the Voice of 
American Conscience comprising fifty `good' Americans to discuss the major issues of 
the day and issue recommendations. These major issues could be discussed at a lower 
level by Clubs of between 100 and 300 people, and by small Groups of about 25 
people.102 The general idea was for a more participatory polity in which forums would 
serve an educative as well as a deliberative function, in order to counter the power of 
vested interests. The chief problem is how such an initiative could get off the ground, 
and there is no obvious answer. Fromm tried to take the idea forward by having a card 
inserted in each copy of The Revolution of Hope which asked readers who they would 
nominate for the National Council and whether they would be prepared to participate in 
a Club or a Group.103 However, democratic forums historically have tended to flourish 
only in revolutionary moments, and the recurring aspiration towards greater 
participation needs to look for new forms. One such development would be through 
more proportional representation and the involvement of non-party organisations in the 
political process. Another would be participation through on-line personal computers, 
and it is to Fromm's credit that he identified the democratic potential of 
computerisation as early as 1968.104 
 
One World 
The ultimate level of political activity which concerns Fromm is the international or 
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global level. In a speech in California in 1962 he argues that the globalisation of 
industrial production and new methods of communication means that `One World' is 
coming into existence and it is probably the `the most revolutionary event in the 
history of mankind'.105 The question he poses is whether the One World will be a 
liveable one or a giant battlefield. He devoted much energy in the 1950s and 1960s to 
supporting the cause of nuclear disarmament and arguing for detente between the 
super-powers.106 Today, however, it is perhaps the issues of global inequality and the 
power of nationalism which are most relevant. On global inequality, Fromm argues for 
the redistribution of resources from the affluent countries to the poorer countries. For 
this to happen, the having mode must be greatly weakened and a `sense of solidarity, 
of caring (not of pity), must emerge.'107 But this is not just a pious hope. He points to 
the oil-price hike of 1973-4 and the Vietnam War as assertions of the rights of former 
colonised states to challenge their exploitation and oppression by the dominant powers. 
The recent past has been rich in words about global re-distribution and poor in 
effective intervention, but it is clear that an issue which was marginal in Fromm's 
lifetime will be of major significance in the new century. 
 The principal ideological obstacle to the development of a harmonious global 
society in Fromm's view is tribalism, a feeling that we have confidence only in those 
who belong to our tribe, who eat the same food, sing the same songs, speak the same 
language. Nationalism is the modern form of tribalism, through which we project all the 
evil in us on the stranger, and in so doing we lose touch with humanity.108 As part of 
his personal `Credo' appended to Beyond the Chains of Illusion, he expressed his belief 
that the One World will become truly human only if a `New Man' comes into being, 
free of tribal loyalties, beyond the call of blood and soil, who feels himself to be a 
`citizen of the world whose loyalty is to the human race and to life'.109 In The Sane 
Society he issues an unequivocal denunciation of nationalism, describing it as our form 
of incest, idolatry and insanity, with patriotism as its cult.110 He laments the 
  
 
 22
unparalleled power of outrage shown against those who have the temerity to deny that 
they love their country or unthinkingly support its war effort, and complains that this 
nationalist rage is often conducted under the rationalisation of solidarity. He argues 
that, on the contrary, human solidarity can be found only when nationalism has been 
transcended; only when we develop our love and reason further than we have done so 
far can we `build a world based on human solidarity and justice' and thereby transform 
it into `a truly human home'.111 The persistence of bellicose nationalism in violent 
conflicts in Eastern Europe and Central Africa indicate the strength of the problem 
identified by Fromm, but in movements towards the development of supra-national 
entities like the European Union and forums such as the global summits there is at least 
the chance that these conflicts can be ameliorated.  
    
 
Conclusion 
 
Fromm's combination of social psychology, humanistic ethics and democratic socialist 
politics offers a powerful alternative to and protest against the postmodernist rejection 
of essentialism. Laclau and Mouffe's assertion that `an anti-essentialist theoretical 
stand is the sine qua non of a new vision for the Left'112 is but one expression of the 
assumption that theories based on an idea of common humanity necessarily lead to 
highly prescriptive and intolerant views of a liberated future. Fromm is, without doubt, 
an essentialist, operating with strong adherence to a communis sensus, but his work on 
the productive character and the goal of the `being mode' conveys a sense of liberated 
expression which is wholly consonant with the widest variety of cultural identities. 
Indeed it is one of the strengths of his work that he draws from ethical sources from 
ancient times to the present century and from a variety of religions and civilisations in 
order to demonstrate the remarkable endurance of the common attachment to 
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freedom, justice, and solidarity. It is a pity that postmodernist theorists fail to take 
seriously the implications of not adhering to some conception of common human 
nature, more often than not dismissing the idea without a thorough consideration.113 
Iris Young comes close to this when she admits that in a strong sense any normative 
theory relies on a theory of human nature, but she then insists that any definition of a 
human nature is dangerous `because it threatens to devalue or exclude some 
acceptable individual desires, cultural characteristics, or ways of life'.114 It seems to me 
that Fromm's approach resolves this contradiction by removing the imputed threat of 
devaluation or exclusion. Different desires and characteristics can be seen as particular 
expressions of universal character orientations, and Fromm's work provides a guide to 
understanding whether they promote or harm the well-being of the individual in 
society, overcoming the danger of the baleful relativism of `anything goes'.  
 Fromm's articulation of a humanistic ethics may be compared with the 
contribution of Alisdair MacIntyre, as mentioned above.115 MacIntyre is often classified 
as a communitarian because of his emphasis on the self as always socially situated, in 
opposition to the notion of the abstract individual favoured by liberals. Fromm's self-
description as a follower of `humanistic communitarian socialism'116 suggests a 
similarity in approach, and in one respect this is true. Both are occasionally prone to 
romanticism, as when MacIntyre concludes that society is waiting for a new St. 
Benedict and Fromm calls for the emergence of a new (non-theistic) religion and hopes 
that a new `great teacher' will emerge.117 However, in MacIntyre's case, the appeal for 
moral renewal is not complemented with a feasible political strategy, and the impulse 
towards community takes on a somewhat conservative disposition. In Fromm's case, 
although he has been criticised for allowing his messianic inclinations to get in the way 
of elucidating a radical politics,118 on the evidence I have outlined above this criticism 
seems to be misplaced. While it is true that Fromm's occasional messianic remarks tend 
to undermine his own account of human freedom,119 it would be unfortunate if they 
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were allowed to occlude the significance of his substantive social theory. Fromm is an 
adept dialectician who identifies ways in which modern methods of social control are 
apt to undermine their own pervasiveness and permit opportunities for protest, reform, 
and the reevaluation of values. This is where he has much more to offer than recent 
worthy but idealist appeals for `intellectual self-defence' and a `compassionate 
revolution' against corporate and state power.120  
 Fromm outlines a progressive political strategy which promotes a radical change 
of values away from instrumentality, possessiveness and acquisitiveness and towards 
social responsibility and respect for people. The social action which aids this change 
includes both old and new social movements, the struggle for reforms as well as direct 
protest. For example, Fromm endorsed the significance of trade union activity in 
struggling for worker participation in management and the reduction of working hours, 
as well as day-to-day struggles on issues such as discrimination and bullying. He was 
one of first social theorists to identify the radical potential of new social movements, 
particularly those concerned with environmentalism and feminism. He lent support to 
reforms which he considered would strengthen and extend democratic political 
processes and, in the case of the basic income scheme, eradicate the causes of 
insecurity which too often push people to reactionary responses or to despair. He 
identified the emergence of `One World' in an era of globalisation which begs for global 
political solutions to the problems of war and peace, production and distribution, and 
sustainability. Ultimately, Fromm held fast to the idea that socialism is the only political 
movement which has the capacity to retain the hope of human liberation, the 
establishment of new moral values, and the `realisation of human solidarity.'121 But he 
recognised the weaknesses of previous forms of socialism, particularly in neglecting the 
visualisation of a better world. In calling for the proliferation of designs, studies and 
experiments `to bridge the gap between what is necessary and what is possible', he 
insisted that the model of the new society be determined by the requirements of the 
  
 
 
  
 
`un-alienated, being-orientated individual'.122 In raising these `big' questions of why 
we live the way we do and how we might live differently and better, Fromm's work 
resolutely opposes the creeping fatalism of contemporary social and political life. 
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